al-Waraqāt fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh [Pages on the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence]
Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī · Prepared by Daud Burke
Arabic–English Student Edition · 10 October 2026 · Complete text, introduction, glossary, bibliography and 27 linked footnotes; covers remain in the book.
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Copyright and Translation Rights
﷽
Copyright and Translation Rights
Copyright © 2026 Daud Burke
Editorial preparation by Daud ʿAbdur-Raḥmān Burke (Abu Ayoub).
The underlying classical Arabic text of al-Waraqāt by Imām al-Juwaynī, together with the attributed classical introductions, comments, and notes, is part of the traditional Islamic scholarly heritage and is in the public domain. No ownership is claimed over the original works themselves.
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Intention Behind the Work
This student edition was prepared to facilitate access to al-Waraqāt by Imām al-Juwaynī, introduce students to the foundations of uṣūl al-fiqh, and preserve and spread beneficial knowledge. The preparer requests sincere duʿāʾ that Allah accept the work, forgive its shortcomings, and make it beneficial to its readers and to everyone who contributed to its preparation.
Note: AI-assisted tools were used at certain stages in the preparation, comparison, and presentation of this material.
Translator’s introduction
Translator’s introduction
الحمد لله رب العالمين، والعاقبة للمتقين، ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم، والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا نبينا محمد، وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين.
All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds, and the good outcome belongs to the God-fearing. There is no power or strength except through Allah, the Most High, the Most Great. May Allah’s blessings and peace be upon our master and Prophet Muḥammad, and upon all his family and companions.
To proceed:
Among the most important requirements of seeking knowledge is correctly understanding what one reads and hears, foremost the Qurʾān and Sunnah, followed by the statements of the scholars of this ummah. Linguistically, fiqh means understanding. As a discipline, uṣūl al-fiqh concerns the principles and methods by which practical legal rulings are derived from their evidence. Students familiar with these principles will also recognize their benefit throughout the Islamic sciences.
For this reason, I have prepared this Arabic-English presentation of al-Waraqāt for beginning students of knowledge. Following the approach of my previous translations, each Arabic passage appears above its English translation. My aim is to bring English-speaking students closer to the Arabic in which they study these sciences, enabling them to follow the text line by line and acquire vocabulary along the way.
The translation and presentation follow these principles:
The Arabic text appears in order, with its English translation directly beneath it.
The translation aims to preserve the meaning and technical distinctions of the original in clear English.
Important Arabic terms are introduced with an English explanation and transliteration, then generally retained in transliteration throughout the chapter. This helps students become familiar with the terminology they will encounter in Arabic study.
Brief footnotes clarify difficult passages, explain necessary qualifications, and provide examples. Explanations drawn from al-Maḥallī are referenced concisely, with the source edition identified in the bibliography.
The glossary at the end of the book reinforces the Arabic terminology encountered in the text.
I hope, with Allah’s aid, to continue presenting foundational works in this style and eventually gather them into a single compilation that makes them readily accessible to students for study.
I ask Allah to accept this work from me and make it a means of attaining His favor and forgiveness. I ask Him to benefit beginning English-speaking students who are learning Arabic, and the teachers guiding them through this important text.
وصلى الله وسلم على سيدنا محمد، وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين.
May Allah’s blessings and peace be upon our master Muḥammad, and upon all his family and companions.
Daud Burke
28 Rabīʿ al-Thānī 1448 AH
10 October 2026
Opening definitions
[Opening definitions]
هَذِهِ وَرَقَاتٌ تَشْتَمِلُ عَلَى مَعْرِفَةِ فُصُولٍ مِنْ أُصُولِ الْفِقْهِ.
These are pages containing knowledge of sections of uṣūl al-fiqh (the foundations of fiqh).
وَذَلِكَ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ جُزْأَيْنِ مُفْرَدَيْنِ.
And that is composed of two individual parts.1
فَالْأَصْلُ مَا يُبْنَى عَلَيْهِ غَيْرُهُ.
Thus, an aṣl (foundation) is that upon which something else is built.
وَالْفَرْعُ مَا يُبْنَى عَلَى غَيْرِهِ.
And a farʿ (branch) is that which is built upon something else.
وَالْفِقْهُ مَعْرِفَةُ الْأَحْكَامِ الشَّرْعِيَّةِ الَّتِي طَرِيقُهَا الِاجْتِهَادُ.
And fiqh is knowledge of the rulings of the Sharīʿah whose means of attainment is ijtihād (qualified scholarly reasoning).
وَالْأَحْكَامُ سَبْعَةٌ: الْوَاجِبُ، وَالْمَنْدُوبُ، وَالْمُبَاحُ، وَالْمَحْظُورُ، وَالْمَكْرُوهُ، وَالصَّحِيحُ، وَالْبَاطِلُ.
And the rulings are seven: wājib (obligatory), mandūb (recommended), mubāḥ (permissible), maḥẓūr (forbidden), makrūh (disliked), ṣaḥīḥ (valid), and bāṭil (invalid).
فَالْوَاجِبُ مَا يُثَابُ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ وَيُعَاقَبُ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ.
The wājib is that which one is rewarded for doing and punished for leaving.2
وَالْمَنْدُوبُ مَا يُثَابُ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ وَلَا يُعَاقَبُ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ.
And the mandūb is that which one is rewarded for doing and not punished for leaving.
وَالْمُبَاحُ مَا لَا يُثَابُ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ وَلَا يُعَاقَبُ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ.
And the mubāḥ is that which one is not rewarded for doing and not punished for leaving.
وَالْمَحْظُورُ مَا يُثَابُ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ وَيُعَاقَبُ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ.
And the maḥẓūr is that which one is rewarded for leaving and punished for doing.3
وَالْمَكْرُوهُ مَا يُثَابُ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ وَلَا يُعَاقَبُ عَلَى فِعْلِهِ.
And the makrūh is that which one is rewarded for leaving and not punished for doing.
وَالصَّحِيحُ مَا يَتَعَلَّقُ بِهِ النُّفُوذُ وَيُعْتَدُّ بِهِ.
And the ṣaḥīḥ is that to which legal effect attaches and which is recognized as valid.4
وَالْبَاطِلُ مَا لَا يَتَعَلَّقُ بِهِ النُّفُوذُ وَلَا يُعْتَدُّ بِهِ.
And the bāṭil is that to which legal effect does not attach and which is not recognized as valid.
Knowledge, reflection, and inference
[Knowledge, reflection, and inference]
وَالْفِقْهُ أَخَصُّ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ.
And fiqh is more specific than ʿilm (knowledge).5
وَالْعِلْمُ مَعْرِفَةُ الْمَعْلُومِ عَلَى مَا هُوَ بِهِ فِي الْوَاقِعِ.
And ʿilm (knowledge) is knowing what is known as it actually is in reality.
وَالْجَهْلُ تَصَوُّرُ الشَّيْءِ عَلَى خِلَافِ مَا هُوَ بِهِ.
And jahl (ignorance) is conceiving of something contrary to how it actually is.6
وَالْعِلْمُ الضَّرُورِيُّ مَا لَمْ يَقَعْ عَنْ نَظَرٍ وَاسْتِدْلَالٍ، كَالْعِلْمِ الْوَاقِعِ بِإِحْدَى الْحَوَاسِّ الْخَمْسِ، وَهِيَ السَّمْعُ وَالْبَصَرُ وَاللَّمْسُ وَالشَّمُّ وَالذَّوْقُ أَوْ بِالتَّوَاتُرِ.
And ʿilm ḍarūrī (necessary knowledge) is that which does not arise through reflection and inference, such as knowledge obtained through one of the five senses—which are hearing, sight, touch, smell, taste—or through tawātur (mass transmission)
وَأَمَّا الْعِلْمُ الْمُكْتَسَبُ فَهُوَ الْمَوْقُوفُ عَلَى النَّظَرِ وَالِاسْتِدْلَالِ.
As for ʿilm muktasab (acquired knowledge), it is that which depends on reflection and inference.
وَالنَّظَرُ هُوَ الْفِكْرُ فِي حَالِ الْمَنْظُورِ فِيهِ.
And naẓar (reflection) is thinking about the state of what is being considered.
وَالِاسْتِدْلَالُ طَلَبُ الدَّلِيلِ.
And istidlāl (inference) is seeking the dalīl (evidence).
وَالدَّلِيلُ هُوَ الْمُرْشِدُ إِلَى الْمَطْلُوبِ.
And dalīl (evidence) is that which guides to what is sought.
وَالظَّنُّ تَجْوِيزُ أَمْرَيْنِ أَحَدُهُمَا أَظْهَرُ مِنَ الْآخَرِ.
And ẓann (probable judgment) is entertaining two possibilities, one of which is more apparent than the other.
وَالشَّكُّ تَجْوِيزُ أَمْرَيْنِ لَا مَزِيَّةَ لِأَحَدِهِمَا عَلَى الْآخَرِ.
And shakk (doubt) is entertaining two possibilities, neither of which has an advantage over the other.
The foundations of fiqh
[The foundations of fiqh]
وَأُصُولُ الْفِقْهِ طُرُقُهُ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْإِجْمَالِ وَكَيْفِيَّةُ الِاسْتِدْلَالِ بِهَا.
And uṣūl al-fiqh comprises the ways to fiqh, considered generally, and how to draw inferences from them.7
وَأَبْوَابُ أُصُولِ الْفِقْهِ أَقْسَامُ الْكَلَامِ وَالْأَمْرُ وَالنَّهْيُ وَالْعَامُّ وَالْخَاصُّ وَالْمُجْمَلُ وَالْمُبَيَّنُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْأَفْعَالُ وَالنَّاسِخُ وَالْمَنْسُوخُ وَالْإِجْمَاعُ وَالْأَخْبَارُ وَالْقِيَاسُ وَالْحَظْرُ وَالْإِبَاحَةُ وَتَرْتِيبُ الْأَدِلَّةِ وَصِفَةُ الْمُفْتِي وَالْمُسْتَفْتِي وَأَحْكَامُ الْمُجْتَهِدِينَ.
And the chapters of uṣūl al-fiqh are: the divisions of speech; commands and prohibitions; al-ʿāmm (general) and al-khāṣṣ (specific) expressions; al-mujmal (unelaborated), al-mubayyan (clarified), and al-ẓāhir (apparent); al-afʿāl (actions); al-nāsikh (abrogating) and al-mansūkh (abrogated); al-ijmāʿ (consensus); al-akhbār (reports); al-qiyās (analogy); prohibition and permission; the ordering of evidence; the qualifications of the muftī (one who gives a fatwā, or legal opinion) and the mustaftī (one who seeks a fatwā); and the rulings concerning mujtahids.
The divisions of speech
[The divisions of speech]
فَأَمَّا أَقْسَامُ الْكَلَامِ فَأَقَلُّ مَا يَتَرَكَّبُ مِنْهُ الْكَلَامُ اسْمَانِ، أَوِ اسْمٌ وَفِعْلٌ، أَوْ فِعْلٌ وَحَرْفٌ، أَوِ اسْمٌ وَحَرْفٌ.
As for the divisions of speech, the least from which speech is composed is two isms (nouns), an ism and a fiʿl (verb), a fiʿl and a ḥarf (particle), or an ism and a ḥarf.
وَالْكَلَامُ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى أَمْرٍ وَنَهْيٍ وَخَبَرٍ وَاسْتِخْبَارٍ.
And speech is divided into command, prohibition, statement, and inquiry.
وَيَنْقَسِمُ أَيْضًا إِلَى تَمَنٍّ وَعَرْضٍ وَقَسَمٍ.
It is also divided into wishing, invitation, and oath.
Literal and figurative usage
[Literal and figurative usage]
وَمِنْ وَجْهٍ آخَرَ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى حَقِيقَةٍ وَمَجَازٍ.
From another perspective, it is divided into ḥaqīqah (literal usage) and majāz (figurative usage).
فَالْحَقِيقَةُ مَا بَقِيَ عَلَى مَوْضُوعِهِ.
Thus, ḥaqīqah is speech used in the meaning for which it was designated.
وَقِيلَ مَا اسْتُعْمِلَ فِيمَا اصْطُلِحَ عَلَيْهِ مِنَ الْمُخَاطَبَةِ.
And it has been said: speech which is used in the meaning agreed upon in communication.
وَالْمَجَازُ مَا تُجُوِّزَ بِهِ عَنْ مَوْضُوعِهِ.
And majāz is speech which is taken beyond the meaning for which it was designated.
وَالْحَقِيقَةُ إِمَّا لُغَوِيَّةٌ وَإِمَّا شَرْعِيَّةٌ وَإِمَّا عُرْفِيَّةٌ.
And ḥaqīqah is either linguistic, established by the Sharīʿah, or customary.8
وَالْمَجَازُ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ بِزِيَادَةٍ أَوْ نُقْصَانٍ أَوْ نَقْلٍ أَوِ اسْتِعَارَةٍ.
And majāz occurs through addition, omission, transfer, or metaphor.
فَالْمَجَازُ بِالزِّيَادَةِ مِثْلُ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: ﴿لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ﴾.
An example of majāz through addition is His saying, Most High: “There is nothing like His likeness.”9
وَالْمَجَازُ بِالنُّقْصَانِ مِثْلُ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: ﴿وَاسْأَلِ الْقَرْيَةَ﴾.
And an example of majāz through omission is His saying, Most High: “And ask the town.”
وَالْمَجَازُ بِالنَّقْلِ كَالْغَائِطِ فِيمَا يَخْرُجُ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ.
And an example of majāz through transfer is ghāʾiṭ [originally, low ground] for what comes out of a person.10
وَالْمَجَازُ بِالِاسْتِعَارَةِ كَقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: ﴿جِدَارًا يُرِيدُ أَنْ يَنْقَضَّ﴾.
And an example of majāz through metaphor is His saying, Most High: “A wall that wants to collapse.”
Commands
[Commands]
وَالْأَمْرُ اسْتِدْعَاءُ الْفِعْلِ بِالْقَوْلِ مِمَّنْ هُوَ دُونَهُ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْوُجُوبِ.
And an amr (command) is verbally requesting someone of lower rank to perform an act, by way of obligation.
وَصِيغَتُهُ اِفْعَلْ، وَهِيَ عِنْدَ الْإِطْلَاقِ وَالتَّجَرُّدِ عَنِ الْقَرِينَةِ تُحْمَلُ عَلَيْهِ.
And its form is “ifʿal [Do].” And when used without qualification and without an accompanying indication, it is understood as requiring obligation…
إِلَّا مَا دَلَّ الدَّلِيلُ عَلَى أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ مِنْهُ النَّدْبُ أَوِ الْإِبَاحَةُ فَيُحْمَلُ عَلَيْهِ.
Except where evidence indicates that recommendation or permission is intended in which case it is understood accordingly.
وَلَا يَقْتَضِي التَّكْرَارَ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ إِلَّا إِذَا دَلَّ الدَّلِيلُ عَلَى قَصْدِ التَّكْرَارِ.
And it does not require repetition, according to the correct view, unless evidence indicates that repetition is intended.
وَلَا يَقْتَضِي الْفَوْرَ.
And it does not require immediate performance.
وَالْأَمْرُ بِإِيجَادِ الْفِعْلِ أَمْرٌ بِهِ وَبِمَا لَا يَتِمُّ الْفِعْلُ إِلَّا بِهِ.
And a command to bring about an act is a command to do it and to do that without which the act cannot be completed.
كَالْأَمْرِ بِالصَّلَاةِ أَمْرٌ بِالطَّهَارَةِ الْمُؤَدِّيَةِ إِلَيْهَا.
For example, the command to pray is a command to perform the purification that leads to it.
وَإِذَا فُعِلَ يَخْرُجُ الْمَأْمُورُ عَنِ الْعُهْدَةِ.
And when it is done, the person commanded is discharged from the obligation.
Those included in commands and prohibitions
الَّذِي يَدْخُلُ فِي الْأَمْرِ وَالنَّهْيِ [وَمَا لَا يَدْخُلُ]
Those included in commands and prohibitions [and those not included]
يَدْخُلُ فِي خِطَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى الْمُؤْمِنُونَ.
The believers are included in the address of Allāh Most High.
وَالسَّاهِي وَالصَّبِيُّ وَالْمَجْنُونُ غَيْرُ دَاخِلِينَ فِي الْخِطَابِ.
And the forgetful person, the child, and the insane person are not included in the address.11
وَالْكُفَّارُ مُخَاطَبُونَ بِفُرُوعِ الشَّرَائِعِ وَبِمَا لَا تَصِحُّ إِلَّا بِهِ وَهُوَ الْإِسْلَامُ، لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى:﴿مَا سَلَكَكُمْ فِي سَقَرَ قَالُوا لَمْ نَكُ مِنَ الْمُصَلِّينَ﴾.
And the unbelievers are addressed by the subsidiary rulings of the revealed laws and by that without which these are not valid, namely Islām, because of His saying, Most High: “What brought you into Saqar? They said: We were not among those who prayed.”
وَالْأَمْرُ بِالشَّيْءِ نَهْيٌ عَنْ ضِدِّهِ.
And a command to do something is a prohibition of its opposite.
وَالنَّهْيُ عَنِ الشَّيْءِ أَمْرٌ بِضِدِّهِ.
And a prohibition of something is a command to do its opposite.
Prohibitions
[Prohibitions]
وَالنَّهْيُ اسْتِدْعَاءُ التَّرْكِ بِالْقَوْلِ مِمَّنْ هُوَ دُونَهُ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْوُجُوبِ.
And nahy (prohibition) is verbally requesting someone of lower rank to refrain, by way of obligation.
وَيَدُلُّ عَلَى فَسَادِ الْمَنْهِيِّ عَنْهُ.
And it indicates the invalidity of what is prohibited.12
وَتَرِدُ صِيغَةُ الْأَمْرِ وَالْمُرَادُ بِهِ الْإِبَاحَةُ أَوِ التَّهْدِيدُ أَوِ التَّسْوِيَةُ أَوِ التَّكْوِينُ.
And the command form can occur with the intended meaning being permission, threat, equalization, or bringing into being.
General and specific expressions
[General and specific expressions]
وَأَمَّا الْعَامُّ فَهُوَ مَا عَمَّ شَيْئَيْنِ فَصَاعِدًا، مِنْ قَوْلِهِ عَمَمْتُ زَيْدًا وَعَمْرًا بِالْعَطَاءِ، وَعَمَمْتُ جَمِيعَ النَّاسِ بِالْعَطَاءِ.
As for the ʿāmm (general expression), it encompasses two things or more, from the expression: “I included Zayd and ʿAmr in the gift,” and “I included all the people in the gift.”
وَأَلْفَاظُهُ أَرْبَعَةٌ: الِاسْمُ الْوَاحِدُ الْمُعَرَّفُ بِالْأَلِفِ وَاللَّامِ، وَاسْمُ الْجَمْعِ الْمُعَرَّفُ بِاللَّامِ.
And its expressions are four13: the singular noun made definite with alif and lām, and the plural noun made definite with lām;
وَالْأَسْمَاءُ الْمُبْهَمَةُ14 كَمَنْ فِيمَنْ يَعْقِلُ، وَمَا فِيمَا لَا يَعْقِلُ، وَأَيٍّ فِي الْجَمِيعِ.
And the indeterminate nouns: ‘man’ for rational beings, ‘mā’ for nonrational things, and ‘ayy’ for both;
وَأَيْنَ فِي الْمَكَانِ، وَمَتَى فِي الزَّمَانِ، وَمَا فِي الِاسْتِفْهَامِ وَالْجَزَاءِ وَغَيْرِهِ، وَلَا فِي النَّكِرَاتِ.
And ‘ayna’ for place, ‘matā’ for time, ‘mā’ in questioning, conditional statements, and other uses, and ‘lā’ with indefinite nouns.
وَالْعُمُومُ مِنْ صِفَاتِ النُّطْقِ، وَلَا يَجُوزُ دَعْوَى الْعُمُومِ فِي غَيْرِهِ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ وَمَا يَجْرِي مَجْرَاهُ.
And generality is an attribute of speech. It is not permissible to claim generality for something else, such as an action or what is treated like it.
Specification
[Specification]
وَالْخَاصُّ يُقَابِلُ الْعَامَّ.
And the khāṣṣ (specific expression) is the opposite of the ʿāmm (general expression).
وَالتَّخْصِيصُ تَمْيِيزُ بَعْضِ الْجُمْلَةِ.
And takhṣīṣ (specification) is distinguishing part of a whole.
وَهُوَ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى مُتَّصِلٍ وَمُنْفَصِلٍ.
And it is divided into connected and separate specification.
فَالْمُتَّصِلُ الِاسْتِثْنَاءُ وَالشَّرْطُ وَالتَّقْيِيدُ بِالصِّفَةِ.
Connected specification comprises exception, condition, and restriction by a descriptive attribute.
وَالِاسْتِثْنَاءُ إِخْرَاجُ مَا لَوْلَاهُ لَدَخَلَ فِي الْكَلَامِ.
And istithnāʾ (exception) is excluding that which, without the exception, would have been included in the statement.
وَإِنَّمَا يَصِحُّ بِشَرْطِ أَنْ يَبْقَى مِنَ الْمُسْتَثْنَى مِنْهُ شَيْءٌ.
It is valid only on condition that something remains of that from which the exception is made.
وَمِنْ شَرْطِهِ أَنْ يَكُونَ مُتَّصِلًا بِالْكَلَامِ.
And among its conditions is that it be connected to the statement.
وَيَجُوزُ تَقْدِيمُ الْمُسْتَثْنَى عَلَى الْمُسْتَثْنَى مِنْهُ.
And it is permissible to place the exception before that from which it is made.
وَيَجُوزُ الِاسْتِثْنَاءُ مِنَ الْجِنْسِ وَمِنْ غَيْرِهِ.
And it is permissible to make an exception from the same kind and from a different kind.
وَالشَّرْطُ يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَتَقَدَّمَ عَلَى الْمَشْرُوطِ.
And a condition may precede what is conditional upon it.
وَالْمُقَيَّدُ بِالصِّفَةِ يُحْمَلُ عَلَيْهِ الْمُطْلَقُ، كَالرَّقَبَةِ قُيِّدَتْ بِالْإِيمَانِ فِي بَعْضِ الْمَوَاضِعِ وَأُطْلِقَتْ فِي بَعْضِ الْمَوَاضِعِ، فَيُحْمَلُ الْمُطْلَقُ عَلَى الْمُقَيَّدِ.
And a muṭlaq (unrestricted) expression is understood according to one that is muqayyad (restricted) by an attribute. For example, a slave is muqayyad by faith in some places and left muṭlaq in others; the muṭlaq expression is therefore understood according to the muqayyad expression.
وَيَجُوزُ تَخْصِيصُ الْكِتَابِ بِالْكِتَابِ.
And it is permissible to specify the Book by the Book;
وَتَخْصِيصُ الْكِتَابِ بِالسُّنَّةِ.
And to specify the Book by the Sunnah;
وَتَخْصِيصُ السُّنَّةِ بِالْكِتَابِ.
And to specify the Sunnah by the Book;
وَتَخْصِيصُ السُّنَّةِ بِالسُّنَّةِ.
And to specify the Sunnah by the Sunnah;
وَتَخْصِيصُ النُّطْقِ بِالْقِيَاسِ، وَنَعْنِي بِالنُّطْقِ قَوْلَ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَقَوْلَ الرَّسُولِ ﷺ.
And to specify an utterance by qiyās (analogy). By “utterance,” we mean the saying of Allāh Most High and the saying of the Messenger ﷺ.
Clarification and interpretation
[Clarification and interpretation]
وَالْمُجْمَلُ مَا يَفْتَقِرُ إِلَى الْبَيَانِ.
And the mujmal (unelaborated expression) is that which needs clarification.
وَالْبَيَانُ إِخْرَاجُ الشَّيْءِ مِنْ حَيِّزِ الْإِشْكَالِ إِلَى حَيِّزِ التَّجَلِّي.
And bayān (clarification) is bringing something from the state of obscurity into clarity.
وَالنَّصُّ مَا لَا يَحْتَمِلُ إِلَّا مَعْنًى وَاحِدًا.
And the naṣṣ (unequivocal expression) is that which carries only one meaning.
وَقِيلَ مَا تَأْوِيلُهُ تَنْزِيلُهُ.
And it has been said: that whose explanation is its being stated.15
وَهُوَ مُشْتَقٌّ مِنْ مِنَصَّةِ الْعَرُوسِ وَهُوَ الْكُرْسِيُّ.
And it is derived16 from minaṣṣat al-ʿarūs, the bride’s platform, which is a chair.
وَالظَّاهِرُ مَا احْتَمَلَ أَمْرَيْنِ أَحَدُهُمَا أَظْهَرُ مِنَ الْآخَرِ.
And the ẓāhir (apparent expression) admits two meanings, one more apparent than the other.
وَيُؤَوَّلُ الظَّاهِرُ بِالدَّلِيلِ وَيُسَمَّى ظَاهِرًا بِالدَّلِيلِ.
And the apparent expression is interpreted on the basis of evidence, and is called apparent on the basis of evidence.17
Actions
الْأَفْعَالُ
Actions
فِعْلُ صَاحِبِ الشَّرِيعَةِ لَا يَخْلُو إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْقُرْبَةِ وَالطَّاعَةِ أَوْ لَا يَكُونَ.
The action of the bearer of the Sharīʿah must fall into one of the following cases: it is performed as an act of drawing near to Allāh and obedience or it is not.
فَإِنْ كَانَ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْقُرْبَةِ وَالطَّاعَةِ فَإِنْ دَلَّ دَلِيلٌ عَلَى الِاخْتِصَاصِ بِهِ يُحْمَلُ عَلَى الِاخْتِصَاصِ.
If the act is one of drawing near to Allāh and obedience, if evidence indicates that it is particular to him, it is understood as particular to him.
وَإِنْ لَمْ يَدُلَّ لَا يَخْتَصُّ بِهِ، لِأَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى قَالَ: ﴿لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ﴾، فَيُحْمَلُ عَلَى الْوُجُوبِ عِنْدَ بَعْضِ أَصْحَابِنَا.
And if it does not indicate this, it is not particular to him, because Allāh Most High said: “You have in the Messenger of Allāh a good example.” It is therefore understood as obligatory according to some of our companions.
وَمِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا مَنْ قَالَ يُحْمَلُ عَلَى النَّدْبِ.
And some of our companions say that it is understood as recommended.
وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَالَ يُتَوَقَّفُ فِيهِ.
And some of them say that judgment concerning it is suspended.
وَإِنْ كَانَ عَلَى وَجْهٍ غَيْرِ وَجْهِ الْقُرْبَةِ وَالطَّاعَةِ، فَيُحْمَلُ عَلَى الْإِبَاحَةِ، فِي حَقِّهِ وَحَقِّنَا.
And if it is performed in a manner other than drawing near to Allāh and obedience, it is understood as permissible, both for him and for us.
وَإِقْرَارُ صَاحِبِ الشَّرِيعَةِ ﷺ عَلَى الْقَوْلِ مِنْ أَحَدٍ هُوَ قَوْلُ صَاحِبِ الشَّرِيعَةِ.
And the approval by the bearer of the Sharīʿah ﷺ of a statement made by someone is [treated as] the statement of the bearer of the Sharīʿah.
وَإِقْرَارُهُ عَلَى الْفِعْلِ كَفِعْلِهِ.
And his approval of an action is like his action.
وَمَا فُعِلَ فِي وَقْتِهِ ﷺ فِي غَيْرِ مَجْلِسِهِ وَعَلِمَ بِهِ وَلَمْ يُنْكِرْهُ، فَحُكْمُهُ حُكْمُ مَا فُعِلَ فِي مَجْلِسِهِ.
And whatever was done in his time ﷺ outside his gathering, which he knew of and did not disapprove, has the same ruling as what was done in his gathering.
Abrogation
[Abrogation]
وَأَمَّا النَّسْخُ فَمَعْنَاهُ الْإِزَالَةُ.
As for naskh (abrogation), its meaning is removal.
وَقِيلَ مَعْنَاهُ النَّقْلُ مِنْ قَوْلِهِمْ نَسَخْتَ مَا فِي هَذَا الْكِتَابِ إِذَا نَقَلْتَهُ.
And it has been said that its meaning is transfer, from their expression “You copied what is in this book,” when you transferred it.
وَحَدُّهُ الْخِطَابُ الدَّالُّ عَلَى رَفْعِ الْحُكْمِ الثَّابِتِ بِالْخِطَابِ الْمُتَقَدِّمِ عَلَى وَجْهٍ لَوْلَاهُ لَكَانَ ثَابِتًا مَعَ تَرَاخِيهِ عَنْهُ.
Its definition is an address indicating the lifting of a ruling established by an earlier address, such that, were it not for this [later address], the ruling would remain established, with the [later address] coming after it.
وَيَجُوزُ نَسْخُ الرَّسْمِ وَبَقَاءُ الْحُكْمِ.
And it is permissible for the Qurʾānic wording to be abrogated while the ruling remains;18
وَنَسْخُ الْحُكْمِ وَبَقَاءُ الرَّسْمِ.
And for the ruling to be abrogated while the Qurʾānic wording remains.
وَيَنْقَسِمُ النَّسْخُ إِلَى بَدَلٍ وَإِلَى غَيْرِ بَدَلٍ.
And abrogation is divided into abrogation with a replacement and without a replacement;
وَإِلَى مَا هُوَ أَغْلَظُ.
And into replacement by something more demanding;
وَإِلَى مَا هُوَ أَخَفُّ.
And by something less demanding.
وَيَجُوزُ نَسْخُ الْكِتَابِ بِالْكِتَابِ.
And it is permissible to abrogate the Book by the Book;
وَنَسْخُ السُّنَّةِ بِالْكِتَابِ وَبِالسُّنَّةِ.
And to abrogate the Sunnah by the Book and by the Sunnah.
وَيَجُوزُ نَسْخُ الْمُتَوَاتِرِ بِالْمُتَوَاتِرِ، وَنَسْخُ الْآحَادِ بِالْآحَادِ وَبِالْمُتَوَاتِرِ، وَلَا يَجُوزُ نَسْخُ الْمُتَوَاتِرِ بِالْآحَادِ.
And it is permissible to abrogate mutawātir (mass-transmitted material) by mutawātir, and to abrogate āḥād (material not reaching mass transmission) by āḥād and by mutawātir; but it is not permissible to abrogate mutawātir by āḥād.19
A section on apparent conflict
فَصْلٌ فِي التَّعَارُضِ
A section on apparent conflict
إِذَا تَعَارَضَ نُطْقَانِ، فَلَا يَخْلُو إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَا عَامَّيْنِ أَوْ خَاصَّيْنِ أَوْ أَحَدُهُمَا عَامًّا وَالْآخَرُ خَاصًّا أَوْ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا عَامًّا مِنْ وَجْهٍ وَخَاصًّا مِنْ وَجْهٍ.
When two utterances conflict, they must either both be ʿāmm (general), both be khāṣṣ (specific), one ʿāmm and the other khāṣṣ, or each ʿāmm in one respect and khāṣṣ in another.
فَإِنْ كَانَا عَامَّيْنِ فَإِنْ أَمْكَنَ الْجَمْعُ بَيْنَهُمَا جُمِعَ.
If both are ʿāmm and it is possible to reconcile them, they are reconciled.
وَإِنْ لَمْ يُمْكِنِ الْجَمْعُ بَيْنَهُمَا، يُتَوَقَّفُ فِيهِمَا إِنْ لَمْ يُعْلَمِ التَّارِيخُ.
And if it is not possible to reconcile them, judgment concerning both is suspended if their chronology is not known.
فَإِنْ عُلِمَ التَّارِيخُ فَيُنْسَخُ الْمُتَقَدِّمُ بِالْمُتَأَخِّرِ.
If their chronology is known, the earlier is abrogated by the later.
وَكَذَا إِنْ كَانَا خَاصَّيْنِ.
And likewise if both are khāṣṣ.
وَإِنْ كَانَ أَحَدُهُمَا عَامًّا وَالْآخَرُ خَاصًّا فَيُخَصُّ الْعَامُّ بِالْخَاصِّ.
And if one is ʿāmm and the other khāṣṣ, the ʿāmm is specified by the khāṣṣ.
وَإِنْ كَانَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا عَامًّا مِنْ وَجْهٍ وَخَاصًّا مِنْ وَجْهٍ، فَيُخَصُّ عُمُومُ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا بِخُصُوصِ الْآخَرِ.
And if each is ʿāmm in one respect and khāṣṣ in another, the ʿāmm scope of each is specified by the khāṣṣ scope of the other.
Consensus
[Consensus]
وَأَمَّا الْإِجْمَاعُ فَهُوَ اتِّفَاقُ عُلَمَاءِ أَهْلِ الْعَصْرِ عَلَى حُكْمِ الْحَادِثَةِ.
As for ijmāʿ (consensus), it is the agreement of the scholars of an age on the ruling of a new issue.
وَنَعْنِي بِالْعُلَمَاءِ الْفُقَهَاءَ.
By scholars, we mean the fuqahāʾ.
وَنَعْنِي بِالْحَادِثَةِ الْحَادِثَةَ الشَّرْعِيَّةَ.
And by a new issue, we mean a new issue concerning the Sharīʿah.
وَإِجْمَاعُ هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ حُجَّةٌ دُونَ غَيْرِهَا، لِقَوْلِهِ ﷺ: «لَا تَجْتَمِعُ أُمَّتِي عَلَى ضَلَالَةٍ».
And the consensus of this community, unlike that of others, is a proof, because of his saying ﷺ: “My ummah [community] does not agree upon misguidance.”
وَالشَّرْعُ وَرَدَ بِعِصْمَةِ هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ.
And the revealed law has affirmed the protection of this community [from agreeing upon misguidance].
وَالْإِجْمَاعُ حُجَّةٌ عَلَى الْعَصْرِ الثَّانِي وَفِي أَيِّ عَصْرٍ كَانَ.
And consensus is a proof for the following age, and in whichever age it occurs.
وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ انْقِرَاضُ الْعَصْرِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
And the passing away of the age is not a condition, according to the correct view.
فَإِنْ قُلْنَا انْقِرَاضُ الْعَصْرِ شَرْطٌ، فَيُعْتَبَرُ قَوْلُ مَنْ وُلِدَ فِي حَيَاتِهِمْ وَتَفَقَّهَ وَصَارَ مِنْ أَهْلِ الِاجْتِهَادِ، وَلَهُمْ أَنْ يَرْجِعُوا عَنْ ذَلِكَ الْحُكْمِ.
If we say that the passing away of the age is a condition, then consideration is given to the opinion of someone born in their lifetime who learns fiqh and becomes qualified for ijtihād; and they may also retract that ruling.
وَالْإِجْمَاعُ يَصِحُّ بِقَوْلِهِمْ وَبِفِعْلِهِمْ.
And consensus is valid through their statements and through their actions;
وَبِقَوْلِ الْبَعْضِ وَفِعْلِ الْبَعْضِ وَانْتِشَارِ ذَلِكَ الْقَوْلِ أَوِ الْفِعْلِ وَسُكُوتِ الْبَاقِينَ عَنْهُ.
And through the statement of some and the action of some, the spread of that statement or action, and the silence of the remainder concerning it.
وَقَوْلُ الْوَاحِدِ مِنَ الصَّحَابَةِ لَيْسَ بِحُجَّةٍ عَلَى غَيْرِهِ عَلَى الْقَوْلِ الْجَدِيدِ، وَفِي الْقَدِيمِ حُجَّةٌ.
And the statement of one of the Companions is not binding evidence for others according to the new position, while according to the old position it is a proof.20
Reports
[Reports]
وَأَمَّا الْأَخْبَارُ فَالْخَبَرُ مَا يَدْخُلُهُ الصِّدْقُ وَالْكَذِبُ.
As for reports, a khabar (report) is that which admits truth and falsehood.
وَالْخَبَرُ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى قِسْمَيْنِ آحَادٍ وَمُتَوَاتِرٍ.
And a report is divided into two kinds: āḥād and mutawātir.
فَالْمُتَوَاتِرُ مَا يُوجِبُ الْعِلْمَ وَهُوَ أَنْ يَرْوِيَ جَمَاعَةٌ لَا يَقَعُ التَّوَاطُؤُ عَلَى الْكَذِبِ عَنْ مِثْلِهِمْ إِلَى أَنْ يَنْتَهِيَ إِلَى الْمُخْبَرِ عَنْهُ فَيَكُونُ فِي الْأَصْلِ عَنْ مُشَاهَدَةٍ أَوْ سَمَاعٍ لَا عَنِ اجْتِهَادٍ.
A mutawātir report necessitates knowledge. It is transmitted by a group whose collusion upon a lie cannot occur, from another such group, until the transmission reaches the subject of the report; its basis is observation or hearing, not ijtihād.
وَالْآحَادُ الَّذِي يُوجِبُ الْعَمَلَ وَلَا يُوجِبُ الْعِلْمَ.
And an āḥād report requires action but does not necessitate knowledge.
وَيَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى قِسْمَيْنِ مُرْسَلٍ وَمُسْنَدٍ.
And it is divided into two kinds: mursal (disconnected) and musnad (connected).
فَالْمُسْنَدُ مَا اتَّصَلَ إِسْنَادُهُ.
A musnad report is one whose chain of transmission is connected.21
وَالْمُرْسَلُ مَا لَمْ يَتَّصِلْ إِسْنَادُهُ.
And a mursal report is one whose chain of transmission is not connected.
فَإِنْ كَانَ مِنْ مَرَاسِيلِ غَيْرِ الصَّحَابَةِ رضي الله عنهم فَلَيْسَ بِحُجَّةٍ إِلَّا مَرَاسِيلَ سَعِيدِ بْنِ الْمُسَيِّبِ فَإِنَّهَا فُتِّشَتْ فَوُجِدَتْ مَسَانِيدَ عَنِ النَّبِيِّ ﷺ.
If it is among the disconnected reports of those other than the Companions رضي الله عنهم, it is not a proof, except for the disconnected reports of Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib: these were investigated and found to have connected chains to the Prophet ﷺ.
وَالْعَنْعَنَةُ تَدْخُلُ عَلَى الْإِسْنَادِ.
And transmission using ʿan (“from”) enters into the chain of transmission.
وَإِذَا قَرَأَ الشَّيْخُ يَجُوزُ لِلرَّاوِي أَنْ يَقُولَ حَدَّثَنِي وَأَخْبَرَنِي.
And when the shaykh reads, the transmitter may say ḥaddathanī (“He narrated to me”) and akhbaranī (“He informed me”).
وَإِنْ قَرَأَ هُوَ عَلَى الشَّيْخِ يَقُولُ أَخْبَرَنِي وَلَا يَقُولُ حَدَّثَنِي.
And if he himself reads to the shaykh, he says akhbaranī and does not say ḥaddathanī.
وَإِنْ أَجَازَهُ مِنْ غَيْرِ قِرَاءَةٍ فَيَقُولُ أَجَازَنِي أَوْ أَخْبَرَنِي إِجَازَةً.
And if he authorizes him without a reading, he says ajāzanī (“He authorized me”) or akhbaranī ijāzatan (“He informed me by authorization”).
Analogy
[Analogy]
وَأَمَّا الْقِيَاسُ رَدُّ الْفَرْعِ إِلَى الْأَصْلِ بِعِلَّةٍ تَجْمَعُهُمَا فِي الْحُكْمِ.
As for qiyās (analogy), it is referring the farʿ (new case) to the aṣl (original case) by an ʿillah (effective cause) that brings them together in the ḥukm (ruling).
وَهُوَ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى ثَلَاثَةِ أَقْسَامٍ: إِلَى قِيَاسِ عِلَّةٍ وَقِيَاسِ دَلَالَةٍ وَقِيَاسِ شَبَهٍ.
And it is divided into three kinds: qiyās al-ʿillah (analogy of effective cause), qiyās al-dalālah (analogy of indication), and qiyās al-shabah (analogy of resemblance).
فَقِيَاسُ الْعِلَّةِ مَا كَانَتِ الْعِلَّةُ فِيهِ مُوجِبَةً لِلْحُكْمِ.
Qiyās al-ʿillah is that in which the ʿillah necessitates the ḥukm.
وَقِيَاسُ الدَّلَالَةِ هُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِأَحَدِ النَّظِيرَيْنِ عَلَى الْآخَرِ وَهُوَ أَنْ تَكُونَ الْعِلَّةُ دَالَّةً عَلَى الْحُكْمِ وَلَا تَكُونَ مُوجِبَةً لِلْحُكْمِ.
And qiyās al-dalālah is inferring one of two comparable cases from the other: the ʿillah indicates the ḥukm without necessitating it.
وَقِيَاسُ الشَّبَهِ هُوَ الْفَرْعُ الْمُتَرَدِّدُ بَيْنَ أَصْلَيْنِ.
And qiyās al-shabah is the farʿ that lies between two aṣls.
وَمِنْ شَرْطِ الْفَرْعِ أَنْ يَكُونَ مُنَاسِبًا لِلْأَصْلِ.
And among the conditions of the farʿ is that it be appropriate to the aṣl.
وَمِنْ شَرْطِ الْأَصْلِ أَنْ يَكُونَ ثَابِتًا بِدَلِيلٍ مُتَّفَقٍ عَلَيْهِ بَيْنَ الْخَصْمَيْنِ.
And among the conditions of the aṣl is that its [ḥukm] be established by evidence agreed upon by the two disputants.22
وَمِنْ شَرْطِ الْعِلَّةِ أَنْ تَطَّرِدَ فِي مَعْلُولَاتِهَا وَلَا تَنْتَقِضَ لَفْظًا وَلَا مَعْنًى.
And among the conditions of the ʿillah is that it hold consistently in the cases to which it applies and not be contradicted in wording or meaning.
وَمِنْ شَرْطِ الْحُكْمِ أَنْ يَكُونَ مِثْلَ الْعِلَّةِ فِي النَّفْيِ وَالْإِثْبَاتِ.
And among the conditions of the ḥukm is that it correspond to the ʿillah in absence and presence.
وَالْعِلَّةُ هِيَ الْجَالِبَةُ لِلْحُكْمِ.
And the ʿillah is that which brings about the ḥukm.
وَالْحُكْمُ هُوَ الْمَجْلُوبُ لِلْعِلَّةِ.
And the ḥukm is that which is brought about by the ʿillah.
Prohibition, permission, and continuity
[Prohibition, permission, and continuity]
وَأَمَّا الْحَظْرُ وَالْإِبَاحَةُ فَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَنْ يَقُولُ إِنَّ الْأَشْيَاءَ عَلَى الْحَظْرِ إِلَّا مَا أَبَاحَتْهُ الشَّرِيعَةُ.
As for prohibition and permission, some people say that things are prohibited except what the Sharīʿah has permitted.
فَإِنْ لَمْ يُوجَدْ فِي الشَّرِيعَةِ مَا يَدُلُّ عَلَى الْإِبَاحَةِ يَتَمَسَّكُ بِالْأَصْلِ وَهُوَ الْحَظْرُ.
If nothing is found in the Sharīʿah indicating permission, one holds to the original presumption, namely prohibition.
وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَنْ يَقُولُ بِضِدِّهِ وَهُوَ أَنَّ الْأَصْلَ فِي الْأَشْيَاءِ أَنَّهَا عَلَى الْإِبَاحَةِ إِلَّا مَا حَظَرَهُ الشَّرْعُ.
And some people say the opposite: the original presumption concerning things is that they are permissible, except what the revealed law has prohibited.
وَمَعْنَى اسْتِصْحَابِ الْحَالِ أَنْ يُسْتَصْحَبَ الْأَصْلُ عِنْدَ عَدَمِ الدَّلِيلِ الشَّرْعِيِّ.
And the meaning of istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl (presuming continuity) is maintaining the original presumption when there is no evidence from the Sharīʿah.23
The ordering of evidence
[The ordering of evidence]
وَأَمَّا الْأَدِلَّةُ فَيُقَدَّمُ الْجَلِيُّ مِنْهَا عَلَى الْخَفِيِّ.
As for evidence, the clear is given precedence over the less clear;
وَالْمُوجِبُ لِلْعِلْمِ عَلَى الْمُوجِبِ لِلظَّنِّ.
And that which produces knowledge over that which produces probable judgment;
وَالنُّطْقُ عَلَى الْقِيَاسِ.
And revealed wording over analogy;
وَالْقِيَاسُ الْجَلِيُّ عَلَى الْخَفِيِّ.
And clear analogy over less clear analogy.
فَإِنْ وُجِدَ فِي النُّطْقِ مَا يُغَيِّرُ الْأَصْلَ [يُعْمَلُ بِالنُّطْقِ].
If something is found in the revealed wording that changes the original presumption, [it is acted upon];24
وَإِلَّا فَيُسْتَصْحَبُ الْحَالُ.
Otherwise, the existing state is presumed to continue.
The muftī and the questioner
[The muftī and the questioner]
وَمِنْ شَرْطِ الْمُفْتِي أَنْ يَكُونَ عَالِمًا بِالْفِقْهِ أَصْلًا وَفَرْعًا مَذْهَبًا وَخِلَافًا.
And among the conditions of the muftī is that he know the principles and detailed rulings of fiqh, the adopted position (madhhab), and the differing views (khilāf).25
وَأَنْ يَكُونَ كَامِلَ الْآلَةِ فِي الِاجْتِهَادِ عَارِفًا بِمَا يَحْتَاجُ إِلَيْهِ فِي اسْتِنْبَاطِ الْأَحْكَامِ مِنَ النَّحْوِ وَاللُّغَةِ وَمَعْرِفَةِ الرِّجَالِ وَتَفْسِيرِ الْآيَاتِ الْوَارِدَةِ فِي الْأَحْكَامِ وَالْأَخْبَارِ الْوَارِدَةِ فِيهَا.
And that he be fully equipped for ijtihād, knowing what is needed to derive rulings: grammar, language, knowledge of transmitters, interpretation of the verses concerning rulings, and reports concerning them.
وَمِنْ شَرْطِ الْمُسْتَفْتِي أَنْ يَكُونَ مِنْ أَهْلِ التَّقْلِيدِ فَيُقَلِّدُ الْمُفْتِيَ فِي الْفُتْيَا.
And among the conditions of the mustaftī is that he be among those who follow another's judgment, so he follows the muftī in the legal opinion.
وَلَيْسَ لِلْعَالِمِ أَنْ يُقَلِّدَ.
And the scholar may not follow another's judgment.26
وَالتَّقْلِيدُ قَبُولُ قَوْلِ الْقَائِلِ بِلَا حُجَّةٍ.
And taqlīd (following another's judgment) is accepting a speaker's statement without evidence.
فَعَلَى هَذَا قَبُولُ قَوْلِ النَّبِيِّ ﷺ يُسَمَّى تَقْلِيدًا.
Accordingly, accepting the statement of the Prophet ﷺ is called taqlīd.
وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَالَ: التَّقْلِيدُ قَبُولُ قَوْلِ الْقَائِلِ وَأَنْتَ لَا تَدْرِي مِنْ أَيْنَ قَالَهُ.
And some say: taqlīd is accepting a speaker's statement without knowing the basis on which he said it.
فَإِنْ قُلْنَا إِنَّ النَّبِيَّ ﷺ كَانَ يَقُولُ بِالْقِيَاسِ فَيَجُوزُ أَنْ يُسَمَّى قَبُولُ قَوْلِهِ تَقْلِيدًا.
So if we say that the Prophet ﷺ used to speak on the basis of analogy, it is permissible to call acceptance of his statement taqlīd.
وَأَمَّا الِاجْتِهَادُ فَهُوَ بَذْلُ الْوُسْعِ فِي بُلُوغِ الْغَرَضِ.
As for ijtihād, it is exerting one's full capacity to attain the objective.
وَالْمُجْتَهِدُ إِنْ كَانَ كَامِلَ الْآلَةِ فِي الِاجْتِهَادِ فَإِنِ اجْتَهَدَ فِي الْفُرُوعِ وَأَصَابَ فَلَهُ أَجْرَانِ وَإِنِ اجْتَهَدَ وَأَخْطَأَ فَلَهُ أَجْرٌ وَاحِدٌ.
And if the mujtahid is fully equipped for ijtihād, then exercises ijtihād in subsidiary matters and is correct, he has two rewards; and if he exercises ijtihād and errs, he has one reward.27
وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَالَ كُلُّ مُجْتَهِدٍ فِي الْفُرُوعِ مُصِيبٌ.
And some say that every mujtahid in subsidiary matters is correct.
وَلَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يُقَالَ كُلُّ مُجْتَهِدٍ فِي الْأُصُولِ الْكَلَامِيَّةِ مُصِيبٌ لِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ يُؤَدِّي إِلَى تَصْوِيبِ أَهْلِ الضَّلَالَةِ وَالْمَجُوسِ وَالْكُفَّارِ وَالْمُلْحِدِينَ.
And it is not permissible to say that every mujtahid in the foundations of theology is correct, because that would lead to declaring correct the people of misguidance, the Magians, the unbelievers, and the heretics.
وَدَلِيلُ مَنْ قَالَ لَيْسَ كُلُّ مُجْتَهِدٍ فِي الْفُرُوعِ مُصِيبًا قَوْلُهُ ﷺ: «مَنِ اجْتَهَدَ وَأَصَابَ فَلَهُ أَجْرَانِ وَمَنِ اجْتَهَدَ وَأَخْطَأَ فَلَهُ أَجْرٌ وَاحِدٌ».
And the evidence of those who say that not every mujtahid in subsidiary matters is correct is his saying ﷺ: “Whoever exercises ijtihād and is correct has two rewards, and whoever exercises ijtihād and errs has one reward.”
الدَّلِيلُ أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ ﷺ خَطَّأَ الْمُجْتَهِدَ تَارَةً وَصَوَّبَهُ أُخْرَى.
The evidence is that the Prophet ﷺ declared the mujtahid mistaken on one occasion and correct on another.
Glossary
[Glossary]
Meanings follow the usage of this matn and its explanatory notes. Each entry pairs formal transliteration with Arabic script.
Āḥād (آحاد) — Reports below the level of mass transmission.
Afʿāl (أفعال) — Actions; also the plural of fiʿl, a verb.
Ajāzanī (أجازني) — “He authorized me”: a formula for transmission by authorization.
Akhbaranī (أخبرني) — “He informed me”: a transmission formula used in the circumstances described in the text.
Akhbaranī ijāzatan (أخبرني إجازة) — “He informed me by authorization.”
ʿĀmm (عام) — A general expression encompassing the members to which it applies.
Amr (أمر) — A command: a demand for an act, expressed from a position of superiority.
ʿAn (عن) — “From”: a word used in reporting a chain of transmission.
ʿAnʿanah (عنعنة) — Transmission expressed through the use of ʿan.
Aṣl (أصل) — A foundation. Depending on context, a principle, legal evidence, the original case in analogy, or an original presumption.
Asmāʾ al-istifhām (أسماء الاستفهام) — Interrogative nouns, used to ask questions.
Asmāʾ al-sharṭ (أسماء الشرط) — Conditional nouns, used to introduce a condition.
Bāṭil (باطل) — Invalid: an act that does not produce the legal effects intended by it.
Bayān (بيان) — Clarification: bringing an expression from obscurity to clarity.
Dalīl (دليل) — Evidence; that which guides reasoning to the matter sought.
Farʿ (فرع) — A branch or subsidiary matter. In analogy, the new case referred to an original case.
Fatwā (فتوى) — A legal opinion given in response to a question.
Fiʿl (فعل) — A verb; in another context, an action.
Fiqh (فقه) — Knowledge of the rulings of the Sharīʿah attained through ijtihād, as defined here.
Fuqahāʾ (فقهاء) — Jurists; the plural of faqīh, one who knows fiqh.
Ghāʾiṭ (غائط) — Originally a low place in the ground; used figuratively for what comes from a person when relieving oneself.
Ḥaddathanī (حدثني) — “He narrated to me”: a formula used when the shaykh reads to the transmitter.
Ḥadīth (حديث) — A report attributed to the Prophet ﷺ.
Ḥaqīqah (حقيقة) — Speech used in the meaning for which it was designated.
Ḥaqīqah lughawiyyah (حقيقة لغوية) — Literal usage according to linguistic designation.
Ḥaqīqah sharʿiyyah (حقيقة شرعية) — Literal usage according to designation in the Sharīʿah.
Ḥaqīqah ʿurfiyyah (حقيقة عرفية) — Literal usage according to customary designation.
Ḥarf (حرف) — A particle: a word whose meaning is expressed in relation to another word.
Ḥaẓr (حظر) — Prohibition.
Ḥukm (حكم) — A ruling. In analogy, the ruling joined to the effective cause.
Ibāḥah (إباحة) — Permission; the permissibility of an act.
Ifʿal (افعل) — “Do”: the command form discussed in the text.
Ijāzah (إجازة) — Authorization to transmit, distinguished here from a reading before the shaykh.
Ijmāʿ (إجماع) — Agreement of the jurists of an age on the ruling of a matter concerning the Sharīʿah.
Ijtihād (اجتهاد) — Exerting one’s full capacity to attain the objective; here, qualified legal reasoning.
ʿIllah (علة) — The effective cause that joins the original and new cases in their ruling.
ʿIlm (علم) — Knowledge: knowing a thing as it is.
ʿIlm ḍarūrī (علم ضروري) — Necessary knowledge, which does not arise through reflection and inference.
ʿIlm muktasab (علم مكتسب) — Acquired knowledge, attained through reflection and inference.
Ism (اسم) — A noun: a word indicating a meaning without indicating a tense.
Isnād (إسناد) — A chain of transmission by which a report is related to its source.
Istidlāl (استدلال) — Seeking evidence or reasoning from it.
Istifhām (استفهام) — Asking a question.
Istiʿārah (استعارة) — Metaphorical borrowing; one of the kinds of figurative usage listed in the text.
Istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl (استصحاب الحال) — Maintaining the original presumption when no evidence changes it; also treating an established state as continuing unless evidence changes it.
Istithnāʾ (استثناء) — An exception: excluding what would otherwise fall within a statement.
Jahl (جهل) — Ignorance: conceiving a thing contrary to what it is, in the definition given here.
Jamʿ (جمع) — Reconciliation of two apparently conflicting utterances so that both can be applied.
Kalām (كلام) — Speech; discussed here through its constituent words and kinds of expression.
Khabar (خبر) — A report: speech that can be described as true or false.
Khāṣṣ (خاص) — A specific expression, distinguished from a general expression.
Khilāf (خلاف) — Differing juristic views; knowledge of these is among the qualifications of the muftī.
Madhhab (مذهب) — An adopted juristic position or school; the intended reference depends on the mujtahid’s level, as explained in the note.
Maḥẓūr (محظور) — Forbidden: an act whose omission in obedience is rewarded and whose commission incurs liability to punishment.
Majāz (مجاز) — Figurative usage: speech used beyond the meaning for which it was designated, in the definition given here.
Makrūh (مكروه) — Disliked: an act whose omission in obedience is rewarded, without punishment for its commission.
Mandūb (مندوب) — Recommended: an act whose performance is rewarded, without punishment for its omission.
Mansūkh (منسوخ) — Abrogated; the earlier ruling lifted by a later address.
Matn (متن) — The base text, distinguished from its commentary and explanatory notes.
Mawṣūlāt (موصولات) — Relative nouns, which introduce a relative clause.
Mubāḥ (مباح) — Permissible: an act whose performance or omission entails neither reward nor punishment in itself.
Mubayyan (مبين) — Clarified: an expression whose intended meaning has been explained.
Muftī (مفتي) — One who gives a fatwā; the qualifications stated here concern a scholar equipped for ijtihād.
Mujmal (مجمل) — An expression needing clarification.
Mujtahid (مجتهد) — A scholar equipped to undertake ijtihād.
Muqayyad (مقيد) — Restricted by an expressed qualification.
Mursal (مرسل) — A report with a disconnected chain, in the terminology used in this matn.
Musnad (مسند) — A report with a connected chain, in the terminology used in this matn.
Mustaftī (مستفتي) — One who seeks a fatwā.
Muṭlaq (مطلق) — Unrestricted by an expressed qualification.
Mutawātir (متواتر) — A report meeting the conditions of mass transmission stated in the text and producing knowledge.
Nahy (نهي) — A prohibition: a demand to refrain from an act, expressed from a position of superiority.
Naql (نقل) — Transmission; also the transfer of a word’s usage discussed among the kinds of majāz.
Nāsikh (ناسخ) — Abrogating; the later address that lifts an earlier ruling.
Naskh (نسخ) — Abrogation: a later address indicating the lifting of an earlier established ruling that would otherwise remain, with the qualifications stated in the text.
Naṣṣ (نص) — An expression admitting only one meaning, in the first definition given here.
Naẓar (نظر) — Reflection on the matter under consideration.
Nuṭq (نطق) — An utterance; in the ordering of evidence, revealed wording from the Book or Sunnah.
Qasam (قسم) — An oath.
Qiyās (قياس) — Analogy: referring a new case to an original case because of an effective cause joining them in their ruling.
Qiyās al-dalālah (قياس الدلالة) — Analogy of indication: the effective cause indicates the ruling without necessitating it.
Qiyās al-ʿillah (قياس العلة) — Analogy of effective cause: the effective cause necessitates the ruling.
Qiyās al-shabah (قياس الشبه) — Analogy of resemblance: a new case lies between two original cases.
Qiyās jalī (قياس جلي) — Clear analogy; given precedence over less clear analogy in the ordering of evidence.
Qiyās khafī (قياس خفي) — Less clear analogy.
Rasm (رسم) — The written form of the Qurʾānic text; the note explains its relation to recitation in the discussion of abrogation.
Rāwī (راوٍ) — A transmitter of a report.
Ṣaḥīḥ (صحيح) — Valid: an act that produces the legal effects intended by it.
Shakk (شك) — Doubt: allowing two possibilities without either being stronger.
Sharīʿah (شريعة) — The revealed law.
Sharṭ (شرط) — A condition; its particular role depends on the legal or linguistic discussion.
Shaykh (شيخ) — The teacher from whom a transmitter receives a report.
Ṣīghah (صيغة) — A linguistic form; here, for example, the form of a command.
Taʿāruḍ (تعارض) — Apparent conflict between two utterances; addressed through the rules in the relevant chapter.
Takhṣīṣ (تخصيص) — Specification: distinguishing part of a whole and limiting a general expression accordingly.
Tamannī (تمني) — Expressing a wish.
Taqlīd (تقليد) — Accepting another’s statement without evidence, or without knowing its basis; the text gives both definitions and their consequences.
Tārīkh (تاريخ) — Chronology: knowledge of which utterance is earlier and which is later.
Tawātur (تواتر) — Mass transmission meeting the conditions described in the text.
Tawaqquf (توقف) — Suspension of judgment where the applicable rule requires it.
ʿUmūm (عموم) — Generality; the scope of a general expression.
Uṣūl al-fiqh (أصول الفقه) — The general ways of establishing fiqh and of reasoning from its evidence.
Wājib (واجب) — Obligatory: an act whose performance is rewarded and whose omission incurs liability to punishment; this does not exclude pardon.
Ẓāhir (ظاهر) — An expression in which one meaning is more apparent than another.
Ẓann (ظن) — Probable judgment: allowing two possibilities while one is stronger.
Bibliography
[Bibliography]
al-Ḥaṭṭāb, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. Qurrat al-ʿayn bi-sharḥ Waraqāt Imām al-Ḥaramayn. With commentary and introduction by Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ ibn Aḥmad al-Gharsī. n.d. PDF. https://www.ajurry.com/vb/filedata/fetch?id=165564.
al-Juwaynī, ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh. “Al-Waraqāt.” In Mutūn ṭālib al-ʿilm, compiled and edited by ʿAbd al-Muḥsin ibn Muḥammad al-Qāsim, level 5. n.d. PDF. https://a-alqasim.com/books/0500mutoon/.
al-Maḥallī, Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. Sharḥ al-Waraqāt fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited, with introduction and commentary, by Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Mūsā ʿAfānah. 1st ed. Jāmiʿat al-Quds, 1999.
Footnotes
1 “That” refers to the expression uṣūl al-fiqh. Its two parts are uṣūl and fiqh. (al-Maḥallī, p. 66). ↩
2 The definition describes the act in respect of its being obligatory. The wording about punishment does not exclude pardon: punishment may occur for some disobedient people while others are pardoned, or leaving the obligation entails punishment without excluding pardon. (al-Maḥallī, p. 71). ↩
3 Leaving it means leaving it out of obedience. The same qualification applies to leaving the makrūh. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 74, 76). ↩
4 It fulfills what the Sharīʿah requires, whether a contract or an act of worship. (al-Maḥallī, p. 77). ↩
5 All fiqh is knowledge, but not all knowledge is fiqh. (al-Maḥallī, p. 79). ↩
6 This definition describes compound ignorance. Simple ignorance is an absence of knowledge. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 80–81). ↩
7 These are general avenues of evidence and ways of reasoning from them, rather than the particular proof for each individual ruling. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 87–89). ↩
8 This threefold division follows the second definition of literal usage. The first definition concerns the original linguistic meaning. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 98–99). ↩
9 In «ليس كمثله شيء» (Qurʾān 42:11), the kāf (كـ) and mithl (مثل) both convey likeness. On this interpretation, taking both in their basic sense would give “There is nothing like His likeness,” whereas the intended meaning is “There is nothing like unto Him.” The repeated expression of likeness is thus treated as majāz by addition by which emphasis is implied to the negation. This is one of several explanations of the verse; the issue receives fuller treatment in tafsīr and ʿaqīdah. ↩
10 Ghāʾiṭ originally refers to low ground; its use here is transferred to what comes out of a person. (al-Maḥallī, p. 101). ↩
11 This concerns taklīf (legal accountability). The period of inattention is distinguished from obligations arising when awareness returns. (al-Maḥallī, p. 112). ↩
12 This rule is qualified in the Shāfiʿī school: prohibition entails invalidity when it concerns the act itself, an essential element or condition, or an inseparable attribute. A separable external prohibition does not entail invalidity; thus, wuḍūʾ with stolen water and a sale during the Friday call may be sinful from the aspect of stealing and turning oneself away from Jumuʿah but yet, valid. This qualifies the apparent generality of the author’s wording. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 117–119). ↩
13 In reality, there are more, and this would be discussed in larger works. ↩
15 Its meaning is understood when it is stated, without needing a further explanation. (al-Maḥallī, p. 146). ↩
16 Here, meaning connected linguistically, not that it is the source. ↩
17 Evidence directs the expression to its initially less apparent meaning, which becomes apparent on account of that evidence. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 147–148). ↩
18 Rasm here concerns the Qurʾānic text and its recitation; the distinction is between abrogating that wording and abrogating its ruling. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 161–162). ↩
19 While this issue is debated theoretically, there is no actual matter in fiqh that this applies to. ↩
20 “New” and “old” refer to the positions of al-Shāfiʿī. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 188–189). ↩
21 In Ḥadīth terminology, it is traditionally that which is apparently connected all the way back to the Prophet ﷺ. And some of their terminology is different than the terminology found here in books of uṣūl. ↩
22 This concerns establishing the ruling of the foundation by evidence accepted by the person drawing the analogy. (al-Maḥallī, p. 206). ↩
23 Here, istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl means preserving original nonexistence when no evidence is found after searching to the best of one’s ability. It also means treating what was established at an earlier time as continuing at a later time, unless evidence changes it. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 212, 215). ↩
24 “Revealed wording” refers to the Book or Sunnah. The bracketed consequence completes the conditional. (al-Maḥallī, pp. 214–215). ↩
25 Knowledge of fiqh covers its principles and particular rulings, including the jurists’ differing views. (al-Maḥallī, p. 217). Aṣl may refer to uṣūl al-fiqh or to the main rules on which particular rulings are built. Madhhab may denote the unrestricted mujtahid’s own position or, for a mujtahid within a school, his imām’s position. (al-Ḥaṭṭāb, p. 177). ↩
26 The scholar meant here is the mujtahid, a scholar qualified for independent legal reasoning. (al-Maḥallī, p. 220). ↩
27 The bracketed words complete the conditional. (al-Maḥallī, p. 223). ↩